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The	  Dangerous	  Fantasy	  of	  Lincoln:	  Framing	  Executive	  Power	  as	  Presidential	  Mastery	  Julie	  Novkov,	  University	  at	  Albany,	  SUNY	  	  	  	   A	  wave	  of	  surprise	  and	  delight	  swept	  the	  star-­‐studded	  room	  as	  the	  silver-­‐haired	  man	  with	  the	  winning	  smile	  strode	  to	  the	  microphone	  at	  the	  2013	  Golden	  Globe	  awards.	  After	  the	  tumultuous	  standing	  ovation,	  former	  President	  Bill	  Clinton	  introduced	  Steven	  Spielberg’s	  Lincoln,1	  which	  would	  net	  Daniel	  Day	  Lewis	  a	  best	  actor	  award	  before	  the	  night	  was	  over:	  	   President	  Lincoln’s	  struggle	  to	  abolish	  slavery	  reminds	  us	  that	  enduring	  progress	  is	  forged	  in	  a	  cauldron	  of	  both	  principle	  and	  compromise.	  This	  brilliant	  film	  shows	  us	  how	  he	  did	  it	  and	  gives	  us	  hope	  that	  we	  can	  do	  it	  again.	  In	  “Lincoln,”	  we	  see	  a	  man	  more	  interesting	  than	  the	  legend,	  and	  a	  far	  better	  guide	  for	  future	  presidents.	  Every	  hard-­‐fought	  effort	  to	  perfect	  our	  union	  has	  demanded	  the	  same,	  sane	  combination	  of	  steely	  resolve	  and	  necessary	  compromises	  that	  Lincoln	  mastered	  to	  preserve	  the	  union	  and	  end	  slavery.2	  	  Clinton’s	  introduction	  simultaneously	  resisted	  Lincoln	  the	  “legend”	  while	  resituating	  him	  as	  a	  primary	  agent:	  a	  masterful	  politician	  who	  both	  saved	  the	  union	  and	  ended	  slavery.	  	   The	  release	  of	  Lincoln	  raises	  anew	  questions	  about	  what	  it	  means	  for	  American	  presidents	  to	  claim	  the	  mantle	  of	  the	  first	  Republican	  president	  and	  the	  Great	  Emancipator.	  Historians	  have	  weighed	  in	  to	  challenge	  the	  narrative	  presented	  by	  the	  film,	  noting	  particularly	  the	  omission	  of	  the	  work	  that	  abolitionists,	  both	  black	  and	  white,	  did	  to	  advance	  the	  cause	  of	  emancipation,	  about	  which	  Lincoln	  was	  decidedly	  ambivalent.3	  The	  point	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  not	  to	  pick	  apart	  the	  historical	  elisions	  or	  participate	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  how	  emancipation	  happened	  (to	  lay	  my	  cards	  on	  the	  table,	  I	  believe	  that	  Foner	  is	  right),	  but	  rather	  to	  think	  about	  the	  cultural	  salience	  of	  Lincoln	  (both	  the	  movie	  and	  the	  president)	  in	  contemporary	  presidential	  politics	  and	  rhetoric.	  	  	   Another	  striking	  moment	  invoking	  the	  sixteenth	  president	  took	  place	  in	  2003,	  when	  George	  W.	  Bush	  stood	  on	  the	  deck	  of	  an	  aircraft	  carrier	  under	  a	  large	  banner	  that	  read	  “Mission	  Accomplished.”	  Bush	  had	  just	  become	  the	  first	  sitting	  American	  president	  to	  land	  on	  an	  aircraft	  carrier	  in	  a	  fixed	  wing	  aircraft,4	  and,	  aboard	  the	  U.S.S.	  Abraham	  Lincoln,	  declared	  that	  combat	  operations	  in	  Iraq	  had	  been	  completed.	  While	  he	  did	  not	  speak	  about	  Lincoln	  directly,	  he	  portrayed	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq	  as	  an	  example	  of	  America’s	  commitment	  to	  “the	  cause	  of	  liberty,”	  and	  celebrated	  the	  military	  intervention	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  American	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Associated	  Press,	  “Bill	  Clinton	  Surprises	  Golden	  Globes	  Audience;	  Gets	  Standing	  Ovation,	  2	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NCrlq34caJE.	  3	  See	  in	  particular,	  Eric	  Foner’s	  scathing	  response	  to	  David	  Brooks’	  laudatory	  editorial	  about	  Lincoln’s	  political	  wizardry.	  Eric	  Foner,	  “Lincoln’s	  Use	  of	  Politics	  for	  Noble	  Ends,”	  
New	  York	  Times,	  November	  26,	  2012.	  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/opinion/lincolns-­‐use-­‐of-­‐politics-­‐for-­‐noble-­‐ends.html?_r=0	  4	  CNN,	  “Commander	  in	  Chief	  Lands	  on	  U.S.S.	  Lincoln,”	  May	  2,	  2003,	  http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/05/01/bush.carrier.landing/.	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investment	  in	  freedom	  at	  home	  and	  throughout	  the	  world.5	  The	  mission	  accomplished	  was	  not	  merely	  the	  end	  of	  combat	  operations	  in	  Iraq,	  by	  Bush’s	  account,	  but	  rather	  also	  entailed	  the	  benevolent	  liberation	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  people	  from	  the	  tyranny	  of	  Saddam	  Hussein.	  	  	  	  
	   	  	   Invoking	  Lincoln	  is	  a	  troubling	  political	  maneuver	  in	  recent	  years	  in	  significant	  ways	  that	  the	  movie	  Lincoln	  highlights.	  We	  will	  notice	  that	  calls	  out	  to	  Lincoln	  by	  presidents	  and	  their	  political	  interlocutors	  (including	  the	  media)	  tend	  to	  take	  on	  two	  forms:	  either	  the	  president	  or	  interlocutor	  is	  claiming	  the	  mantle	  of	  Lincoln	  and	  calling	  attention,	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly,	  to	  his	  own	  Lincolnesque	  behavior,	  or	  a	  critic	  of	  the	  president	  is	  claiming	  that	  the	  president’s	  behavior	  or	  rhetoric	  is	  not,	  in	  fact,	  Lincolnesque.	  In	  either	  scenario,	  what	  is	  Lincolnesque	  is	  normatively	  good,	  an	  example	  of	  effective	  leadership	  in	  a	  context	  of	  crisis.	  The	  Lincolnesque	  president	  is	  one	  beset	  by	  conflict	  and	  turmoil,	  both	  in	  internal	  political	  circles	  and	  in	  the	  surrounding	  atmosphere,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  grave	  threat	  to	  the	  nation.	  He	  responds	  by	  managing	  the	  turmoil	  effectively,	  shouldering	  the	  burdens	  of	  leadership	  and	  bearing	  them	  with	  grace,	  self-­‐deprecating	  humor,	  and	  ruthless	  pursuit	  of	  ultimate	  success.	  	   Lincoln	  was	  broadly	  released	  in	  the	  United	  States	  on	  November	  9,	  2012,	  three	  days	  after	  Barack	  Obama	  was	  re-­‐elected	  President.	  The	  movie	  focuses	  intensely	  on	  Lincoln’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  political	  struggle	  over	  the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  as	  the	  Civil	  War	  was	  moving	  toward	  its	  conclusion.	  The	  movie	  thus	  delves	  deeply	  into	  the	  complex	  intra-­‐party	  politics	  of	  the	  Republicans	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Democrats’	  struggles	  to	  reassert	  authority	  after	  their	  drubbing	  in	  the	  election	  of	  1864	  (as	  the	  movie	  underlines,	  the	  Democrats	  lost	  50	  seats).6	  Lincoln	  is	  portrayed	  in	  three	  roles:	  as	  a	  masterful	  politician,	  as	  a	  loving	  father,	  and	  as	  a	  husband	  in	  a	  troubled	  marriage.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  roles,	  he	  balances	  his	  compassion	  and	  commitment	  to	  his	  values	  with	  his	  pragmatic	  negotiation	  of	  difficult	  situations	  to	  achieve	  desired	  outcomes.	  The	  audience	  is	  encouraged	  to	  sympathize	  with	  the	  extraordinarily	  difficult	  circumstances	  he	  faces	  and	  to	  appreciate	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  George	  W.	  Bush:	  "Address	  to	  the	  Nation	  on	  Iraq	  From	  the	  U.S.S.	  Abraham	  Lincoln,"	  May	  1,	  2003.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68675.	  6	  While	  the	  movie	  highlights	  the	  vast	  political	  gulf	  between	  the	  radical	  and	  conservative	  Republicans,	  it	  does	  not	  address	  the	  split	  between	  the	  Copperheads	  and	  War	  Democrats	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  Democrats’	  poor	  electoral	  performance.	  
The	  image	  of	  an	  American	  president	  displaying	  American	  triumphal	  military	  might	  on	  a	  vessel	  named	  for	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  was	  controversial,	  primarily	  because	  it	  soon	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  mission,	  however	  it	  was	  defined,	  was	  not	  indeed	  “accomplished.”	  George	  W.	  Bush’s	  critics	  continued	  to	  question	  both	  his	  conduct	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq	  and	  his	  decision	  to	  initiate	  military	  operations	  in	  that	  nation	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  given	  the	  unfinished	  business	  with	  the	  Taliban	  and	  al	  Qaeda.	  The	  question	  not	  asked,	  however,	  was	  whether	  Bush	  was	  properly	  invoking	  Lincoln	  –	  or	  more	  fundamentally	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  invoke	  Lincoln.	  	  Associated	  Press,	  May	  3,	  2003	  	  
3	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
grace	  and	  humor	  he	  employs	  as	  he	  achieves	  success.	  The	  movie	  honestly	  acknowledges	  Lincoln’s	  moderate	  stances	  on	  black	  rights	  and	  Reconstruction,	  but	  downplays	  these	  issues	  in	  favor	  of	  presenting	  the	  man	  himself	  as	  a	  foresighted	  and	  wise	  leader	  who	  wants	  (and	  maneuvers	  to	  achieve)	  particular	  political	  results	  for	  deeply	  moral	  reasons.	  	   One	  critical	  scene	  in	  the	  movie	  features	  Lincoln	  discussing	  with	  his	  advisors	  the	  reasons	  for	  pressing	  the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment	  forward	  at	  this	  historical	  moment.	  His	  advisors	  are	  wrangling	  over	  whether	  it	  is	  worth	  the	  effort	  and	  political	  capital	  to	  pursue	  the	  amendment,	  given	  that	  the	  war	  is	  moving	  toward	  conclusion.	  Lincoln	  interrupts	  the	  bickering	  to	  situate	  himself	  as	  a	  leader:	  “I	  decided	  that	  the	  Constitution	  gives	  me	  war	  powers,	  but	  no	  one	  knows	  just	  exactly	  what	  those	  powers	  are.	  Some	  say	  they	  don't	  exist.	  I	  don't	  know.	  I	  decided	  I	  needed	  them	  to	  exist	  to	  uphold	  my	  oath	  to	  protect	  the	  Constitution.”7	  Lincoln,	  and	  Lincoln	  alone,	  was	  the	  interpreter	  of	  war	  powers	  and	  seized	  them,	  using	  his	  oath	  to	  uphold	  the	  Constitution	  as	  a	  bootstrap.	  He	  then	  determined	  that	  his	  war	  powers	  enabled	  him	  to	  seize	  slaves	  and	  consider	  them	  confiscated	  property	  (a	  determination	  that	  historically	  was	  made	  first	  by	  his	  generals	  and	  to	  which	  he	  only	  reluctantly	  acceded	  after	  a	  time).8	  	   This	  left	  Lincoln	  in	  a	  further	  conundrum,	  however,	  because	  of	  his	  maintenance	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  south	  was	  not	  a	  nation.	  How	  could	  he	  continue	  to	  insist	  that	  the	  south	  was	  merely	  a	  pack	  of	  individual	  rebels,	  that	  the	  southern	  states	  themselves	  were	  not	  in	  revolt,	  much	  less	  in	  secession	  while	  simultaneously	  justifying	  the	  effective	  abrogation	  of	  states’	  laws	  concerning	  slavery?	  Nonetheless,	  Lincoln	  continues,	  “Negroes	  in	  those	  states	  are	  slaves,	  hence	  property,	  hence	  my	  war	  powers	  allow	  me	  to	  confiscate’em	  as	  such.	  So	  I	  confiscated	  ‘em.”9	  What	  enables	  him	  to	  cancel	  state	  laws	  in	  this	  fashion?	  	  “I	  felt	  the	  war	  demanded	  it;	  my	  oath	  demanded	  it;	  I	  felt	  right	  with	  myself;	  and	  I	  hoped	  it	  was	  legal	  to	  do	  it,	  I’m	  hoping	  still.	  Two	  years	  ago	  I	  proclaimed	  these	  people	  emancipated	  –	  ‘then,	  hence	  forward	  and	  forever	  free.’”10	  The	  Gordian	  knot	  has	  been	  slashed	  by	  the	  necessities	  of	  war,	  and	  the	  sword	  Lincoln	  wields	  is	  his	  oath	  of	  office.	  	   Why	  then	  the	  need	  for	  the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment	  if	  war	  powers	  could	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  emancipation?	  Lincoln	  explains:	  	   But	  let's	  say	  the	  courts	  decide	  I	  had	  no	  authority	  to	  do	  it.	  They	  might	  well	  decide	  that.	  Say	  there's	  no	  amendment	  abolishing	  slavery.	  Say	  it's	  after	  the	  war,	  and	  I	  can	  no	  longer	  use	  my	  war	  powers	  to	  just	  ignore	  the	  courts'	  decisions,	  like	  I	  sometimes	  felt	  I	  had	  to	  do.	  Might	  those	  people	  I	  freed	  be	  ordered	  back	  into	  slavery?	  That's	  why	  I'd	  like	  to	  get	  the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment	  through	  the	  House,	  and	  on	  its	  way	  to	  ratification	  by	  the	  states,	  wrap	  the	  whole	  slavery	  thing	  up,	  forever	  and	  aye.	  As	  soon	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  “Memorable	  Quotes	  for	  Lincoln,”	  IMDb	  Lincoln	  (2012),	  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0443272/quotes.	  8	  CITE	  Klinkner	  &	  Smith?	  9	  “Memorable	  Quotes	  for	  Lincoln.”	  In	  this	  speech,	  screenplay	  writer	  Kushner	  avoids	  mentioning	  Dred	  Scott,	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  Lincoln’s	  surety	  that	  states	  retain	  the	  right	  to	  defend	  slavery	  and	  define	  slaves	  as	  property;	  Dred	  Scott	  has	  become	  something	  of	  a	  dog	  whistle	  for	  anti-­‐abortion	  opponents	  of	  Roe	  v.	  Wade.	  10	  “Memorable	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  Lincoln.”	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as	  I'm	  able.	  Now.	  End	  of	  this	  month.	  And	  I'd	  like	  you	  to	  stand	  behind	  me.	  Like	  my	  cabinet's	  most	  always	  done.11	  	  The	  danger	  Lincoln	  foresees	  is	  that	  emancipation	  will	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  permanent	  act.	  It	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  producing	  only	  a	  temporary	  legal	  status	  subject	  to	  change	  once	  the	  power	  behind	  the	  Proclamation	  has	  evaporated	  with	  the	  cessation	  of	  hostilities.	  He	  expresses	  concern	  about	  how	  the	  courts	  will	  handle	  these	  questions	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  war’s	  end,	  and	  uncertainty	  that	  emancipation	  will	  stick.	  	  The	  answer	  to	  this	  conundrum,	  he	  asserts,	  is	  rapid	  action	  on	  the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment.	  Implied	  underneath	  the	  speech,	  read	  into	  it	  by	  the	  audience’s	  presumed	  collective	  knowledge	  of	  Lincoln	  as	  the	  emancipator,	  is	  an	  understanding	  that	  he	  is	  pressing	  forward	  to	  secure	  emancipation	  for	  fundamentally	  moral	  reasons;	  pragmatic	  motivations	  play	  no	  role	  in	  his	  discussion	  either	  of	  the	  Emancipation	  Proclamation	  or	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  emancipation	  generally.	  Convinced,	  his	  advisors	  cease	  their	  bickering	  and	  prepare	  to	  move	  forward	  together	  to	  muster	  the	  necessary	  votes	  to	  pass	  the	  amendment	  in	  the	  house.	  The	  key	  moment	  in	  the	  speech,	  however,	  is	  in	  Lincoln’s	  simultaneous	  justification	  of	  his	  occasional	  circumvention	  or	  defiance	  of	  the	  law	  coupled	  with	  his	  implied	  acceptance	  that	  only	  the	  war	  justifies	  these	  acts,	  and	  this	  justification	  will	  expire	  with	  the	  cessation	  of	  hostilities.	  This	  critical	  speech	  presents	  two	  fundamental	  arguments	  of	  the	  movie	  about	  Lincoln	  and	  about	  politics.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  Lincoln	  is	  great	  and	  admirable	  because	  he	  is	  both	  driven	  by	  a	  fundamental	  moral	  compass	  and	  because	  he	  is	  capable	  of	  acting	  pragmatically	  to	  true	  his	  aim.	  (In	  fact,	  one	  scene	  between	  Lincoln	  and	  Thaddeus	  Stevens	  invokes	  the	  compass	  image,	  with	  Lincoln	  praising	  Stevens’	  compass’s	  unwavering	  point	  to	  true	  north	  but	  pointing	  out	  that	  it	  cannot	  help	  to	  navigate	  the	  swamps	  that	  lie	  in	  the	  way.)	  Lincoln	  does	  face	  moral	  dilemmas,	  but	  we	  know	  that	  his	  resolution	  of	  them	  –	  choosing	  to	  press	  for	  the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment	  rather	  than	  negotiating	  an	  end	  to	  the	  war	  with	  slavery	  as	  a	  bargaining	  chip,	  finally	  realizing	  that	  he	  must	  heartlessly	  press	  Mary	  Todd	  Lincoln	  into	  allowing	  their	  oldest	  son	  to	  go	  to	  war	  –	  are	  the	  morally	  better	  choices.	  In	  making	  these	  choices,	  he	  stands	  forth	  among	  advisors	  and	  opponents	  (and	  Mary	  Todd	  Lincoln)	  who	  act	  as	  foils.	  	  The	  second,	  though,	  is	  highlighted	  by	  Lincoln’s	  posture	  toward	  the	  law,	  buried	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  his	  self-­‐described	  “sermon.”	  His	  war	  powers	  render	  him	  simultaneously	  a	  lawmaker,	  enabling	  him	  to	  justify	  the	  Emancipation	  Proclamation	  as	  a	  legal	  act	  (both	  in	  terms	  of	  invoking	  law	  and	  permissible	  under	  the	  law)	  and	  a	  creature	  above	  the	  law	  itself,	  with	  the	  power	  to	  exercise	  his	  discretion	  to	  determine	  when	  he	  “has	  to”	  ignore	  the	  rulings	  of	  the	  courts.	  	  	  Here	  and	  throughout	  the	  movie,	  the	  fundamental	  rightness	  of	  his	  ultimate	  choices	  act	  to	  justify	  the	  means	  he	  employs	  –	  that	  he	  must	  employ	  –	  to	  achieve	  them.	  Lincoln	  starts	  by	  discussing	  the	  necessity	  for	  obtaining	  twenty	  additional	  votes	  for	  the	  amendment	  with	  his	  skeptical	  Secretary	  of	  State	  William	  Seward	  (played	  to	  bitchy	  perfection	  by	  David	  Straithaim).	  Seward	  is	  eventually	  convinced	  that	  these	  votes	  must	  be	  obtained	  by	  any	  means	  necessary	  and	  unhappily	  shoulders	  the	  unsavory	  task	  of	  working	  with	  political	  operatives	  to	  distribute	  promises	  of	  spoils	  positions	  to	  defeated	  Democrats	  to	  secure	  their	  votes.	  Ultimately,	  Lincoln	  himself	  must	  contribute	  to	  this	  effort,	  though	  he	  is	  portrayed	  only	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as	  using	  moral	  suasion	  to	  sway	  wavering	  members	  of	  Congress.	  More	  of	  a	  grey	  area,	  however,	  is	  his	  promise	  to	  conservative	  Republican	  Francis	  Blair	  to	  meet	  with	  Confederate	  delegates	  to	  discuss	  peace,	  a	  promise	  that	  he	  fails	  to	  mention	  and	  about	  which	  he	  misdirects,	  and	  ultimately	  lies,	  to	  prevent	  angering	  the	  radical	  Republicans	  and	  several	  members	  of	  his	  own	  cabinet.	  To	  add	  insult	  to	  injury,	  Lincoln	  consciously	  chooses	  to	  double-­‐cross	  the	  Confederate	  commissioners	  by	  deciding,	  in	  a	  dramatic	  scene	  late	  at	  night	  with	  only	  his	  two	  telegraphers	  as	  witness,	  to	  delay	  the	  commissioners	  and	  prevent	  their	  entry	  into	  DC	  prior	  to	  the	  vote	  on	  the	  amendment.	  Lincoln	  breaks	  a	  lot	  of	  eggs	  to	  prepare	  his	  omelette	  as	  the	  audience	  nods	  approvingly	  at	  his	  audacity	  and	  capacity	  to,	  as	  Mary	  Todd	  Lincoln	  notes,	  pick	  his	  way	  carefully	  through	  the	  treacherous	  swamp	  of	  politics	  better	  than	  any	  other	  living	  man.	  Of	  course,	  by	  1865,	  the	  real	  Lincoln	  had	  engaged	  in	  many	  more	  controversial	  and	  constitutionally	  questionable	  acts.	  He	  had	  suspended	  habeas	  corpus	  independently,	  only	  gaining	  congressional	  approval	  post	  hoc.	  He	  had	  cracked	  down	  on	  free	  speech	  vigorously	  to	  stem	  anti-­‐enlistment	  and	  anti-­‐draft	  fervor,	  and	  newspaper	  editors	  particularly	  were	  targeted.	  And	  he	  had	  imposed	  martial	  law	  in	  areas	  far	  from	  combat.	  A	  few	  of	  these	  issues	  are	  raised	  in	  the	  movie,	  but	  only	  by	  being	  placed	  as	  hyperbolic	  charges	  in	  the	  mouths	  of	  unsympathetic	  and	  racist	  opponents	  to	  the	  Thirteenth	  Amendment.	  (The	  one	  time	  Spielberg’s	  Lincoln	  addresses	  his	  own	  policy	  of	  imposing	  the	  death	  penalty	  on	  deserters,	  it	  is	  to	  puzzle	  briefly	  over	  and	  then	  grant	  a	  pardon	  request	  for	  a	  sixteen	  year	  old	  boy.)	  	  For	  a	  movie	  so	  deeply	  steeped	  in	  politics	  and	  partisanship,	  Lincoln	  was	  received	  in	  an	  oddly	  apolitical	  fashion.	  Its	  liberal	  (in	  modern	  terms,	  read	  Democratic)	  credentials	  were	  impeccable:	  Director	  Steven	  Spielberg	  has	  supported	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  and	  counts	  Bill	  Clinton	  among	  his	  friends,	  and	  screenplay	  author	  Tony	  Kushner	  is	  best	  known	  for	  his	  Tony-­‐winning	  play	  about	  the	  AIDS	  epidemic,	  Angels	  in	  America.	  Yet	  modern	  Republicans	  continue	  to	  invoke	  themselves	  as	  the	  party	  of	  Lincoln	  and	  the	  Democrats	  in	  the	  movie	  are	  portrayed	  as	  racist,	  venal,	  or	  both.12	  The	  movie	  garnered	  praise	  from	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  critics,	  earning	  a	  90%	  fresh	  rating	  from	  Rotten	  Tomatoes.13	  As	  noted	  above,	  David	  Brooks	  waxed	  rhapsodic	  about	  Lincoln’s	  message,	  lauding	  it	  as	  a	  celebration	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  good	  that	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  skilled	  political	  actors	  and	  urging	  people	  to	  see	  the	  movie	  to	  regain	  their	  faith	  in	  the	  political	  process	  despite	  its	  warts.14	  The	  more	  liberal	  Ruth	  Marcus	  opined	  that	  Congress	  itself	  should	  be	  invited	  to	  a	  special	  screening.15	  Why	  does	  a	  movie	  that	  celebrates	  Lincoln	  and	  emancipation	  while	  highlighting	  the	  corruption	  and	  nastiness	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  One	  of	  the	  few	  moments	  of	  comic	  relief	  comes	  when	  Thaddeus	  Stevens	  invites	  to	  his	  office	  a	  Democratic	  House	  member	  seeking	  assistance	  in	  retaining	  his	  seat	  after	  a	  contested	  election.	  Stevens’	  task	  is	  to	  convince	  the	  Democrat	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  amendment	  in	  exchange	  for	  Stevens’	  support	  in	  his	  struggle.	  Stevens	  sourly	  questions	  him:	  “You	  are	  a	  Democrat.	  What's	  the	  matter	  with	  you?	  Are	  you	  wicked?”	  “Memorable	  Quotes	  for	  Lincoln.”	  13	  http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/lincoln_2011/	  14	  David	  Brooks,	  “Why	  We	  Love	  Politics,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  November	  22,	  2012.	  Accessed	  online	  at	  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/23/opinion/brooks-­‐why-­‐we-­‐love-­‐politics.html?_r=0.	  15	  Ruth	  Marcus,	  “Congress	  Should	  See	  the	  Movie	  Lincoln,”	  Washington	  Post,	  November	  25,	  2012.	  Accessed	  online	  at	  http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/180442191.html?refer=y.	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of	  politics	  not	  simply	  get	  read	  as	  more	  Hollywood	  liberalism?	  And	  why	  this	  portrait	  of	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  now,	  a	  portrait	  that	  has	  obviously	  tapped	  into	  something	  deeply	  salient	  in	  American	  culture	  and	  politics?16	  	  To	  answer	  these	  questions,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  presidencies	  of	  George	  W.	  Bush	  and	  Barack	  Obama.	  Lincoln	  the	  movie,	  I	  argue,	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  Bush’s	  presidency	  and	  a	  frame	  for	  Obama’s.	  Both	  men	  have	  portrayed	  themselves	  as	  leading	  the	  nation	  through	  parlous	  times	  and	  situated	  themselves	  (or	  attempted	  to	  do	  so)	  as	  strong	  leaders	  whose	  primary	  goal	  is	  to	  protect	  and	  preserve	  national	  security.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  have	  both	  on	  occasion	  donned	  Lincoln’s	  mantle	  or	  had	  it	  placed	  on	  their	  shoulders,	  looking	  to	  make	  difficult	  and	  painful	  choices	  with	  bloody	  consequences	  but	  justifying	  these	  choices	  through	  the	  executive’s	  duty	  to	  the	  nation.	  And	  both	  men	  have	  employed	  the	  Lincoln	  maneuver	  of	  using	  war	  powers	  to	  situate	  themselves	  as	  lawmakers	  and	  persons	  above	  the	  law.	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  unlike	  Lincoln,	  was	  not	  elected	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  national	  crisis	  (though	  the	  election	  itself	  almost	  provoked	  one).	  While	  upper	  echelon	  security	  experts	  knew	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  al	  Qaeda,	  the	  nation	  voting	  for	  Bush	  and	  watching	  his	  inauguration	  did	  not	  see	  the	  threat	  of	  imminent	  war	  on	  the	  horizon.	  After	  9/11,	  though,	  Bush	  had	  to	  find	  his	  feet	  immediately	  as	  a	  wartime	  commander	  in	  chief.	  Throughout	  his	  presidency,	  he	  and	  those	  around	  him	  turned	  to	  Lincoln	  for	  inspiration.	  In	  his	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  address	  in	  2006,	  Bush	  situated	  himself	  as	  a	  hero	  refusing	  the	  easy	  path:	  	  	  Fellow	  citizens,	  we've	  been	  called	  to	  leadership	  in	  a	  period	  of	  consequence.	  We've	  entered	  a	  great	  ideological	  conflict	  we	  did	  nothing	  to	  invite.	  .	  .	  .	  Sometimes	  it	  can	  seem	  that	  history	  is	  turning	  in	  a	  wide	  arc	  toward	  an	  unknown	  shore.	  Yet	  the	  destination	  of	  history	  is	  determined	  by	  human	  action,	  and	  every	  great	  movement	  of	  history	  comes	  to	  a	  point	  of	  choosing.	  Lincoln	  could	  have	  accepted	  peace	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  disunity	  and	  continued	  slavery.	  .	  .	  .	  Today,	  having	  come	  far	  in	  our	  own	  historical	  journey,	  we	  must	  decide:	  Will	  we	  turn	  back	  or	  finish	  well?17	  	  	  The	  unspoken	  easy	  path	  Bush	  was	  rejecting	  was	  also	  a	  path	  of	  peace	  along	  with	  appeasement	  of	  an	  evil	  enemy,	  in	  his	  case	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  “great	  ideological	  conflict”	  the	  United	  States	  had	  not	  invited.	  He	  presented	  himself	  as	  determined	  to	  stay	  the	  course,	  an	  image	  reinforced	  by	  some	  conservative	  columnists	  who	  portrayed	  him	  as	  a	  steadfast	  adherent	  to	  a	  challenging,	  but	  correct,	  path.18	  	   As	  his	  second	  term	  drew	  nearer	  to	  its	  close,	  Bush	  made	  a	  point	  of	  highlighting	  his	  interest	  in	  Lincoln.	  He	  talked	  about	  reading	  biographies	  of	  Lincoln;	  at	  one	  point,	  he	  and	  Karl	  Rove	  apparently	  read	  Doris	  Kearns	  Goodwin’s	  Team	  of	  Rivals,	  the	  main	  source	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  I	  can	  recall	  only	  a	  few	  other	  movies	  about	  politics	  and	  about	  congressional	  politics	  in	  particular	  that	  had	  this	  kind	  of	  cultural	  resonance,	  and	  these	  –	  for	  instance,	  Mr.	  Smith	  Goes	  
to	  Washington	  and	  Advise	  and	  Consent	  –	  date	  back	  to	  1939	  and	  1962	  respectively.	  	  17	  George	  W.	  Bush:	  "Address	  Before	  a	  Joint	  Session	  of	  the	  Congress	  on	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Union,"	  January	  31,	  2006.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  
Presidency	  Project.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65090.	  18	  See,	  e.g.,	  Newt	  Gingrich,	  “Bush	  and	  Lincoln,”	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  September	  7,	  2006,	  p.	  7.	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Kushner’s	  Lincoln	  screenplay,	  together.19	  In	  his	  final	  news	  conference,	  he	  repeated	  the	  by-­‐then	  well	  established	  theme	  of	  how	  Lincoln	  had	  been	  an	  inspiration	  for	  him	  in	  his	  refusal	  to	  bow	  down	  before	  public	  criticism	  and	  hostility.	  He	  noted	  the	  hostility	  and	  anger	  that	  his	  critics	  had	  expressed	  toward	  him,	  but	  stated	  that	  “It's	  not	  the	  first	  time,	  however,	  in	  history	  that	  people	  have	  expressed	  themselves	  in	  sometimes	  undignified	  ways.	  I've	  been	  reading,	  you	  know,	  a	  lot	  about	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  during	  my	  Presidency,	  and	  there	  was	  some	  pretty	  harsh	  discord	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  16th	  President,	  just	  like	  there's	  been	  harsh	  discord	  for	  the	  30	  -­‐-­‐	  43d	  President.”	  He	  then	  likened	  himself	  to	  Lincoln	  as	  a	  President	  who	  did	  not	  avoid	  controversy	  by	  failing	  to	  take	  hard	  decisions:	  	   That's	  just	  not	  my	  nature.	  I'm	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  that,	  you	  know,	  is	  willing	  to	  take	  on	  hard	  tasks,	  and	  in	  times	  of	  war	  people	  get	  emotional;	  I	  understand	  that.	  Never	  really,	  you	  know,	  spent	  that	  much	  time,	  frankly,	  worrying	  about	  the	  loud	  voices.	  I,	  of	  course,	  hear	  them,	  but	  they	  didn't	  affect	  my	  policy,	  nor	  did	  they	  affect	  how	  I	  made	  decisions.20	  	  	  In	  this	  statement,	  by	  invoking	  Lincoln	  and	  Lincoln’s	  war,	  Bush	  presented	  Lincoln	  as	  a	  President	  who	  had	  made	  hard	  and	  controversial,	  but	  ultimately	  right,	  decisions	  during	  wartime.	  He	  then	  paralleled	  his	  own	  experiences	  to	  Lincoln’s,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  refusing	  to	  respond	  to	  criticisms	  either	  of	  his	  substantive	  policy	  positions	  or	  his	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  	   He	  was	  almost	  certainly	  thinking	  of	  his	  handling	  of	  the	  military	  conflicts	  he	  engaged	  against	  al	  Qaeda	  and	  the	  Taliban	  and	  in	  Iraq,	  and	  perhaps	  specifically	  of	  the	  firestorm	  of	  criticism	  that	  engulfed	  his	  handling	  of	  individuals	  he	  termed	  enemy	  combatants.	  Many	  books	  and	  articles	  have	  considered	  the	  legalities	  and	  illegalities	  of	  the	  Guantanamo	  Bay	  detention	  facility,	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  elicited	  by	  torture	  in	  quasi-­‐legal	  proceedings,	  and	  the	  President’s	  fudging	  of	  civil	  liberties	  issues	  during	  the	  military	  engagements.21	  The	  issue	  on	  which	  this	  discussion	  will	  concentrate	  is	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  handling	  of	  detainees	  and	  attempts	  to	  articulate	  and	  justify	  policies	  regarding	  them.	  The	  point	  is	  not	  so	  much	  to	  add	  any	  new	  insights	  to	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  legalities,	  but	  rather	  to	  show	  how	  the	  Bush	  Administration’s	  actions	  keyed	  pretty	  consciously	  on	  a	  Lincolnian	  framework,	  thereby	  setting	  up	  a	  debate	  over	  whether	  Bush	  was	  or	  was	  not	  like	  the	  masterful	  political	  genius	  he	  was	  invoking.	  	   From	  near	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  military	  engagement	  in	  Afghanistan,	  the	  Bush	  Administration	  portrayed	  the	  conflict	  as	  unprecedented	  and	  as	  posing	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  nation,	  and	  pressed	  the	  view	  that	  the	  executive	  branch	  had	  broad	  plenary	  powers	  available	  not	  only	  to	  prosecute	  the	  war,	  but	  to	  make	  determinations	  about	  the	  thorny	  legal	  issues	  it	  raised.	  This	  stance	  is	  evident	  in	  Jay	  Bybee’s	  memo	  of	  January	  2002,	  where	  he	  declares	  that	  “Article	  II	  of	  the	  Constitution	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  President	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Karl	  Rove,	  “Bush	  is	  a	  Book	  Lover,”	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  December	  25,	  2008.	  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123025595706634689.html.	  20	  George	  W.	  Bush:	  "The	  President's	  News	  Conference,"	  January	  12,	  2009.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  Project.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85430.	  21	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is	  vested	  with	  all	  of	  the	  federal	  executive	  power.”	  While	  he	  acknowledges	  that	  Congress	  “possesses	  its	  own	  specific	  foreign	  affairs	  powers,”	  the	  Article	  II	  grant	  provides	  “an	  undefined	  executive	  power”	  and	  Article	  I’s	  grant	  to	  Congress	  is	  “limited.”	  Therefore,	  he	  asserts,	  “From	  the	  very	  beginnings	  of	  the	  Republic,	  this	  constitutional	  arrangement	  has	  been	  understood	  to	  grant	  the	  President	  plenary	  control	  over	  the	  conduct	  of	  foreign	  relations,”	  including	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  legal	  determinations	  about	  treaty	  status	  and	  the	  appropriate	  treatment	  of	  captured	  individuals.22	  	   This	  general	  belief	  grounded	  specific	  findings	  among	  the	  President’s	  legal	  staff	  and	  officers	  in	  the	  Departments	  of	  Justice	  and	  Defense	  that	  the	  executive	  branch	  had	  the	  power	  to	  determine	  that	  detainees	  captured	  in	  the	  war	  were	  not	  prisoners	  of	  war	  subject	  to	  the	  protections	  of	  the	  Geneva	  Conventions,23	  to	  establish	  military	  commissions	  outside	  of	  the	  normal	  procedures	  of	  courts	  martial	  to	  determine	  the	  fate	  of	  detainees,24	  to	  authorize	  torture	  to	  obtain	  information	  from	  detainees,25	  and	  to	  set	  up	  a	  system	  for	  continuing	  detention	  and	  interrogation	  of	  detainees,26	  among	  other	  things.	  All	  of	  these	  actions	  reinforced	  the	  idea	  that	  what	  the	  administration	  was	  calling	  the	  War	  on	  Terror	  was	  a	  unique	  war	  against	  a	  unique	  kind	  of	  enemy,	  and	  that	  only	  the	  executive	  branch	  had	  the	  capacity	  and	  authority	  to	  respond	  appropriately.	  	  	   Bush	  understood	  himself	  to	  face	  a	  conundrum	  not	  unlike	  Lincoln’s.	  Where	  Lincoln	  was	  in	  the	  difficult	  position	  of	  prosecuting	  a	  war	  that	  could	  not	  be	  declared	  a	  war	  because	  he	  could	  not	  acknowledge	  secession,	  Bush	  was	  prosecuting	  a	  war	  against	  a	  non-­‐state	  enemy.	  Both	  had	  a	  need	  to	  define	  and	  understand	  their	  respective	  military	  conflicts	  in	  terms	  of	  war,	  because	  both	  relied	  on	  the	  legal	  frame	  of	  war	  as	  an	  existential	  threat	  to	  the	  nation	  to	  leverage	  the	  vast	  expansion	  of	  executive	  authority	  contemplated	  in	  their	  orders	  and	  those	  of	  their	  subordinates.	  Yet	  both	  faced	  political	  and	  legal	  imperatives	  not	  to	  define	  the	  conflicts	  as	  war.	  In	  Lincoln’s	  case,	  to	  do	  so	  would	  acknowledge	  secession	  as	  legitimate	  and	  define	  the	  southern	  states	  (and	  not	  just	  certain	  individuals	  in	  them)	  as	  in	  rebellion.	  In	  Bush’s	  case,	  to	  define	  the	  conflict	  as	  a	  traditional	  war	  would	  afford	  the	  Geneva	  Convention’s	  legal	  protections	  to	  the	  detainees,	  trigger	  greater	  collaborative	  responsibilities	  with	  Congress,	  and	  imply	  significant	  limits	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  pursuit	  of	  al	  Qaeda	  could	  cross	  national	  borders	  or	  interfere	  with	  other	  sovereign	  nations.	  	  	   Bush	  thus	  reprised	  Lincoln’s	  triumph	  of	  will.	  The	  military	  conflict	  was	  a	  War	  on	  Terror	  without	  a	  declaration	  of	  war	  against	  another	  sovereign	  nation;	  it	  involved	  massive	  deployments	  of	  American	  troops	  and	  the	  building	  of	  an	  international	  military	  coalition	  to	  engage	  in	  what	  almost	  any	  sane	  observer	  would	  identify	  as	  acts	  of	  war.	  Yet	  Bush	  persisted	  in	  defining	  the	  war	  as	  unique	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  combatants	  and	  in	  the	  threat	  it	  posed	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  using	  these	  claims	  to	  leverage	  his	  insistence	  that	  the	  executive	  branch	  alone	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  craft	  legal	  principles	  to	  govern	  the	  engagements.	  Lincoln’s	  words	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Jay	  Bybee,	  “Memorandum	  for	  Alberto	  Gonzales,	  Counsel	  to	  the	  President,	  and	  William	  J.	  Haynes	  II,	  General	  Counsel	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,”	  January	  22,	  2002.	  23	  Donald	  Rumsfeld,	  “Memorandum	  for	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,”	  January	  19,	  2002.	  24	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  “Military	  Commission	  Order	  No.	  1,”	  March	  21,	  2002.	  25	  Jay	  Bybee,	  “Memorandum	  for	  Alberto	  Gonzales,	  Counsel	  to	  the	  President	  re	  Standards	  of	  Conduct	  for	  Interrogation,”	  August	  2,	  2002.	  26	  Donald	  Rumsfeld,	  “Memorandum	  for	  the	  General	  Counsel,	  Department	  of	  Defense,”	  January	  15,	  2003.	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from	  Kushner’s	  script	  –	  “I	  felt	  the	  war	  demanded	  it;	  my	  oath	  demanded	  it;	  I	  felt	  right	  with	  myself;	  and	  I	  hoped	  it	  was	  legal	  to	  do	  it,	  I'm	  hoping	  still”	  –	  fit	  easily	  in	  Bush’s	  mouth.	  	   Even	  Bush’s	  troubled	  relationship	  with	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  can	  fit	  into	  the	  Lincoln	  frame.	  The	  Justices	  were	  not	  impressed	  with	  Bush’s	  efforts	  to	  sort	  out	  the	  legalities	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  challenges	  to	  the	  military	  tribunals	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	  rulings	  that	  repeatedly	  demanded	  that	  Bush	  collaborate	  with	  Congress	  and	  afford	  a	  standard	  and	  internationally	  recognized	  set	  of	  due	  process	  protections	  to	  the	  detainees.	  The	  detainee	  cases	  were	  hailed	  by	  liberal	  commentators	  as	  reinforcing	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  drawing	  the	  line	  at	  an	  extreme	  interpretation	  of	  the	  unitary	  executive.27	  However,	  just	  as	  Justice	  Taney’s	  stern	  rebuke	  to	  Lincoln	  in	  Ex	  Parte	  Merryman	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  Merryman’s	  status,	  the	  rulings	  had	  a	  very	  limited	  concrete	  effect	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Guantanamo	  Bay	  despite	  their	  bold	  rhetoric.28	  	  	   As	  but	  one	  example	  of	  Bush’s	  efforts	  to	  assert	  mastery,	  consider	  the	  signing	  statement	  he	  issued	  in	  validating	  funding	  for	  the	  Detainee	  Treatment	  Act	  of	  2005.	  	   The	  executive	  branch	  shall	  construe	  Title	  X	  in	  Division	  A	  of	  the	  Act,	  relating	  to	  detainees,	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  the	  constitutional	  authority	  of	  the	  President	  to	  supervise	  the	  unitary	  executive	  branch	  and	  as	  Commander	  in	  Chief	  and	  consistent	  with	  the	  constitutional	  limitations	  on	  the	  judicial	  power,	  which	  will	  assist	  in	  achieving	  the	  shared	  objective	  of	  the	  Congress	  and	  the	  President,	  evidenced	  in	  Title	  X,	  of	  protecting	  the	  American	  people	  from	  further	  terrorist	  attacks.29	  	  	  In	  this	  remarkable	  statement,	  the	  President	  asserts	  his	  authority	  to	  supervise	  a	  unitary	  executive	  branch	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  war	  powers	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  courts	  are	  limited	  in	  their	  capacity	  to	  challenge	  his	  actions.	  The	  justification	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  President’s	  policy	  (purportedly	  legitimized	  by	  Congress	  in	  the	  DTA)	  of	  protecting	  against	  terrorism.	  Note	  particularly	  that	  he	  invokes	  terrorist	  attacks	  rather	  than	  acts	  of	  war,	  thereby	  expanding	  and	  rendering	  more	  vague	  his	  own	  grant	  of	  authority	  as	  a	  war	  leader.	  The	  statement	  then	  instruct	  the	  courts	  that	  the	  executive	  branch	  “shall	  construe”	  the	  act	  to	  deny	  subject	  matter	  jurisdiction	  “over	  any	  existing	  or	  future	  action,	  including	  applications	  for	  writs	  of	  habeas	  corpus.”30	  This	  action,	  of	  course,	  echoes	  Lincoln’s	  suspensions	  of	  habeas,	  which	  were	  only	  addressed	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  after	  the	  war	  had	  ended	  and	  Lincoln	  had	  been	  assassinated.	  	   Finally,	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  argument	  for	  broad	  and	  unbounded	  executive	  authority	  based	  on	  emergency	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  a	  Department	  of	  Justice	  memorandum	  from	  2006	  supporting	  warrantless	  wiretapping	  by	  the	  National	  Security	  Agency.	  The	  document	  opened	  with	  a	  straightforward	  enough	  claim	  that	  the	  President’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  CITE	  28	  As	  Kim	  Lane	  Scheppele	  notes,	  the	  suspected	  terrorists	  got	  all	  of	  the	  ringing	  language	  from	  the	  courts,	  but	  the	  government	  maintained	  control	  of	  the	  facts	  on	  the	  ground,	  leading	  to	  rulings	  that	  endorsed	  high	  principle	  but	  had	  little	  concrete	  effect.	  Kim	  Lane	  Scheppele,	  “The	  New	  Judicial	  Deference,”	  Boston	  University	  Law	  Review	  92:	  89-­‐170	  (2012).	  29	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  “President's	  Statement	  on	  Signing	  of	  H.R.	  2863,	  the	  "Department	  of	  Defense,	  Emergency	  Supplemental	  Appropriations	  to	  Address	  Hurricanes	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Mexico,	  and	  Pandemic	  Influenza	  Act,	  2006,”	  December	  30,	  2005.	  30	  “Signing	  Statement.”	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powers	  were	  at	  their	  maximum	  level	  under	  the	  Youngstown	  Sheet	  and	  Tube	  framework	  due	  to	  the	  September	  2001	  AUMF.	  	  It	  then	  went	  on	  to	  claim,	  breathtakingly,	  that	  allowing	  the	  courts	  to	  interpret	  the	  existing	  statutory	  framework	  for	  wiretapping	  to	  bar	  the	  NSA	  from	  taking	  matters	  into	  its	  own	  hands	  would	  be	  unconstitutional	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  President’s	  duty	  to	  protect	  the	  nation:	  	   Indeed,	  were	  FISA	  and	  Title	  III	  interpreted	  to	  impede	  the	  President’s	  ability	  to	  use	  the	  traditional	  tool	  of	  electronic	  surveillance	  to	  detect	  and	  prevent	  future	  attacks	  by	  a	  declared	  enemy	  that	  has	  already	  struck	  at	  the	  homeland	  and	  is	  engaged	  in	  ongoing	  operations	  against	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  FISA,	  as	  applied	  to	  that	  situation,	  would	  be	  called	  into	  very	  serious	  doubt.	  In	  fact,	  if	  this	  difficult	  constitutional	  question	  had	  to	  be	  addressed,	  FISA	  would	  be	  unconstitutional	  as	  applied	  to	  this	  narrow	  context.31	  	  Again,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  emergency	  justified	  extraordinary	  action,	  indeed	  taking	  it	  out	  of	  the	  category	  of	  the	  extraordinary.	  Independent	  executive	  interpretation	  of	  what	  was	  legal	  was,	  in	  this	  memo’s	  framework,	  necessary	  and	  constitutionally	  required	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  the	  executive’s	  imperative	  duty	  to	  protect	  the	  nation.	  	   Bush’s	  actions	  provoked	  a	  debate	  between	  liberals	  and	  conservatives	  over	  whether	  he	  was	  or	  was	  not	  comparable	  to	  Lincoln.	  Various	  columnists	  and	  pundits	  from	  David	  Frum	  to	  Newt	  Gingrich	  argued	  for	  the	  comparison.	  In	  his	  documentary	  on	  Bush	  aired	  on	  Fox	  News,	  Bret	  Baier	  argued	  that	  Bush	  was	  inspired	  by	  Lincoln	  and	  that	  their	  respective	  presidencies	  had	  many	  similarities.32	  University	  of	  Baltimore	  Law	  School	  professor	  Garrett	  Epps	  was	  provoked	  enough	  to	  respond	  acerbically	  that	  “George	  W.	  Bush	  is	  Lincoln	  the	  way	  Dan	  Quayle	  is	  Jack	  Kennedy.	  Bush	  does,	  however,	  stack	  up	  quite	  nicely	  against	  Andrew	  Johnson,	  one	  of	  the	  least	  successful	  presidents	  in	  our	  history.	  That’s	  because,	  even	  though	  Bush	  has	  most	  of	  Johnson’s	  flaws,	  he	  runs	  almost	  no	  risk	  of	  being	  impeached	  by	  his	  own	  party.”33	  	   But	  was	  this	  merely	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  controversial	  Bush	  presidency,	  his	  embrace	  of	  the	  unitary	  executive,	  and	  his	  own	  efforts	  to	  liken	  himself	  to	  the	  sixteenth	  President?	  Apparently	  not.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Department of Justice, “Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security 
Agency Described by the President,” January 19, 2006.  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf. See also David Schultz, 
“Killing Americans: Obama’s Constitutional Arrogance,” Schultz’s Take, February 8, 2013. 
http://schultzstake.blogspot.com/. 32	  “George	  Bush:	  Fighting	  to	  the	  Finish,”	  Fox	  News,	  original	  air	  date	  February	  19,	  2008.	  33	  Garrett	  Epps,	  “You,	  Sir,	  are	  no	  Abe	  Lincoln,”	  Salon,	  August	  23,	  2006.	  http://www.salon.com/2006/08/23/bush_lincoln/.	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  constitutional	  history	  and	  situated	  himself	  as	  a	  racial	  moderate).34	  While	  some	  of	  the	  likening	  of	  Obama	  to	  Lincoln	  was	  cultural,	  as	  Ron	  English’s	  portrait	  of	  Obama	  as	  Lincoln	  illustrates,	  Obama	  consciously	  managed	  the	  parallel	  as	  well.	  He	  continued	  to	  invoke	  Lincoln	  in	  both	  of	  his	  inaugurations,	  opting	  to	  be	  sworn	  in	  using	  the	  same	  Bible	  upon	  which	  Lincoln	  had	  taken	  his	  oath	  of	  office.35	  	   While	  Obama	  ran	  his	  first	  campaign	  on	  a	  note	  of	  hope	  –	  among	  other	  hopes,	  Lincoln’s	  hope	  for	  peace	  –	  once	  in	  office,	  he	  faced	  the	  same	  conundrums	  that	  had	  bedeviled	  Bush	  in	  the	  ongoing	  military	  engagements	  that	  sought	  to	  address	  al	  Qaeda	  and	  other	  terrorist	  groups.	  He	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  figure	  out	  a	  way	  to	  close	  down	  Guantanamo	  Bay,	  and	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  construct	  an	  adequate	  framework	  for	  treating	  the	  detainees	  as	  either	  accused	  criminals	  or	  prisoners	  of	  war.	  While	  Obama	  did	  fulfill	  his	  campaign	  promises	  to	  draw	  down	  troops	  in	  Iraq	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  avoided	  referring	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,	  he	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  he	  had	  no	  intentions	  of	  ceasing	  the	  American	  armed	  forces’	  pursuit	  of	  alleged	  terrorists	  and	  the	  nation	  remained	  in	  a	  state	  of	  war.	  	  	   Obama	  began	  with	  the	  stated	  intention	  of	  restoring	  what	  scholars	  and	  pundits	  critical	  of	  Bush	  described	  as	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  On	  January	  15,	  2009,	  the	  Office	  of	  Legal	  Counsel	  prepared	  the	  ground	  just	  prior	  to	  Obama’s	  inauguration	  by	  releasing	  a	  memorandum	  disavowing	  2001-­‐03	  series	  of	  memoranda	  from	  the	  OLC	  “respecting	  the	  allocation	  of	  authorities	  between	  the	  President	  and	  Congress	  in	  matters	  of	  war	  and	  national	  security.”36	  While	  the	  memorandum	  noted	  that	  the	  OLC	  had	  “confronted	  novel	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  National	  Constitution	  Center,	  “A	  More	  Perfect	  Union:	  A	  Virtual	  Exhibit	  of	  Barack	  Obama’s	  Race	  Speech,”	  http://constitutioncenter.org/amoreperfectunion/.	  35	  “Up	  Close	  With	  Lincoln’s	  Bible,”	  USA	  Today,	  http://www.usatoday.com/videos/news/nation/2013/01/17/up-­‐close-­‐with-­‐lincolns-­‐bible/1842985/.	  36	  Steven	  Bradbury,	  “Memorandum	  Re	  Status	  of	  Certain	  OLC	  Opinions	  Issued	  in	  the	  Aftermath	  of	  the	  Terrorist	  Attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001,”	  Office	  of	  Legal	  Counsel,	  January	  
Artist	  Ron	  English,	  published	  in	  Maura	  Judkis,	  “Barack	  Obama	  as	  Honest	  Abe,	  U.S.	  
News	  and	  World	  Report,	  February	  5,	  2009.	  
Barack	  Obama’s	  candidacy	  and	  election	  invited	  discussion	  about	  Lincoln	  due	  to	  his	  race.	  However,	  the	  relationship	  between	  Obama	  and	  Lincoln	  has	  been	  more	  than	  skin	  deep,	  and	  like	  his	  immediate	  predecessor,	  Obama	  has	  courted	  comparisons	  to	  Lincoln	  and	  invoked	  him.	  Likewise,	  his	  supporters	  and	  allies	  have	  placed	  Lincoln’s	  mantle	  on	  his	  shoulders.	  Also	  a	  son	  of	  Illinois,	  Obama	  launched	  his	  campaign	  from	  the	  Old	  Illinois	  State	  Capitol	  in	  Springfield,	  where	  Lincoln	  delivered	  his	  “house	  divided”	  speech	  in	  1858.	  And	  the	  turning	  point	  of	  Obama’s	  primary	  campaign	  was	  his	  “Perfect	  Union”	  speech	  at	  the	  National	  Constitution	  Center	  in	  Philadelphia,	  which	  raised	  interesting	  parallels	  to	  Lincoln’s	  campaign	  speeches	  (historian	  Harold	  Holzer	  notes	  particularly	  the	  connections	  to	  Lincoln’s	  Cooper	  Union	  Address,	  in	  which	  Lincoln	  also	  invoked	  	  
12	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
complex	  legal	  questions	  in	  a	  time	  of	  great	  danger	  and	  under	  extraordinary	  time	  pressure,”	  the	  withdrawn	  opinions	  were	  criticized	  for	  not	  following	  the	  ordinary	  practice	  of	  OLC,	  focusing	  on	  broad	  statements	  about	  executive	  authority	  rather	  than	  narrow	  questions	  about	  specific	  events	  and	  scenarios.	  While	  cynics	  might	  see	  the	  memo	  simply	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  curtail	  executive	  power	  just	  before	  it	  passed	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  Democratic	  commander	  in	  chief,	  the	  stance	  reflected	  Obama’s	  campaign	  rhetoric	  well,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  Democratic	  critics	  of	  the	  Bush	  administration.	  It	  did	  not,	  however,	  stick.	  	   Probably	  the	  best	  example	  of	  Obama’s	  operation	  within	  the	  Lincolnian	  frame	  is	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  former	  constitutional	  law	  professor’s	  attempts	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  legalities	  of	  killing	  American	  citizens	  suspected	  of	  terrorism.	  Despite	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  resistance	  to	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  assertion	  of	  unitary	  executive	  theories,	  the	  Obama	  administration	  has	  continued	  to	  rely,	  if	  less	  openly,	  on	  these	  theories.	  The	  recently	  revealed	  Department	  of	  Justice	  White	  Paper	  outlines	  a	  provocative	  theory	  of	  executive	  power	  that	  is	  consistent	  both	  with	  the	  Bush	  administration’s	  approach	  and	  with	  a	  heroic	  Lincoln	  model	  of	  executive	  power	  in	  circumstances	  of	  crisis	  and	  legal	  uncertainty.	  	  	   The	  memo	  introduces	  the	  idea	  as	  “a	  legal	  framework,”	  though	  it	  specifically	  disavows	  any	  broad	  intent	  to	  establish	  guidelines	  for	  what	  might	  make	  any	  killing	  of	  a	  U.S.	  citizen	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  continued	  military	  and	  quasi-­‐military	  engagements.	  The	  memo	  limits	  its	  application	  to	  circumstances	  in	  which	  “an	  informed,	  high-­‐level	  official	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government”	  has	  found	  that	  the	  individual	  “poses	  an	  imminent	  threat	  of	  violent	  attack	  against	  the	  United	  States,”	  where	  capture	  of	  the	  individual	  is	  “infeasible,”	  and	  where	  “the	  operation	  would	  be	  conducted	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  applicable	  law	  of	  war	  principles”.37	  The	  memo	  identifies	  the	  grounding	  authority	  for	  such	  actions	  in	  a	  principle	  of	  “national	  self	  defense,”	  and	  while	  it	  acknowledges	  that	  under	  due	  process,	  individuals	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  their	  own	  lives,	  “that	  interest	  must	  be	  balanced	  against	  the	  United	  States’	  interest	  in	  forestalling	  the	  threat	  of	  violence	  and	  death	  to	  other	  Americans.”38	  	   The	  memo	  proceeds	  from	  the	  national	  right	  of	  self	  defense	  to	  the	  executive	  branch	  quickly.	  Beyond	  the	  AUMF,	  the	  authority	  for	  the	  lawful	  use	  of	  force	  against	  terrorist	  forces	  arises	  from	  “the	  President’s	  constitutional	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  nation.”39	  The	  argument	  thus	  circles	  upon	  itself:	  the	  President	  is	  specifically	  empowered	  to	  make	  these	  judgments	  and	  exercise	  force	  lawfully	  in	  this	  fashion	  because	  the	  authority	  for	  taking	  such	  an	  action	  is	  rooted	  in	  executive	  power	  (as	  well	  as	  a	  more	  broadly	  defined	  national	  interest).	  The	  framework	  goes	  a	  step	  further,	  implying	  that	  the	  power	  is	  not	  a	  discretionary	  option	  but	  rather	  a	  constitutional	  responsibility	  of	  the	  commander	  in	  chief.	  	  	   The	  memo	  leverages	  the	  unique	  circumstances	  of	  the	  conflict	  (framed	  as	  being	  against	  al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  its	  associated	  forces,	  the	  definition	  of	  which	  is	  presumably	  left	  to	  the	  executive	  branch).	  As	  it	  notes,	  “There	  is	  little	  judicial	  or	  other	  authoritative	  precedent	  that	  speaks	  directly	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  geographic	  scope	  of	  a	  non-­‐international	  armed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15,	  2009.	  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20090115.pdf.	  37	  Department	  of	  Justice	  White	  Paper,	  “Lawfulness	  of	  a	  Lethal	  Operation	  Directed	  Against	  a	  U.S.	  Citizen	  Who	  is	  a	  Senior	  Operational	  Leader	  of	  Al-­‐Qa’ida	  or	  an	  Associated	  Force,”	  n.d.,	  http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf,	  1.	  38	  “Lawfulness	  of	  a	  Lethal	  Operation,”	  2.	  39	  “Lawfulness	  of	  a	  Lethal	  Operation,”	  2.	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conflict	  in	  which	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  is	  a	  transnational,	  non-­‐state	  actor	  and	  where	  the	  principal	  theater	  of	  operations	  is	  not	  within	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  nation	  that	  is	  a	  party	  to	  the	  conflict.”40	  The	  key	  issue	  is	  that	  military	  operations	  fall	  under	  the	  law	  of	  war,	  while	  actions	  against	  domestic/civilian/citizen	  suspects	  fall	  within	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system.	  The	  memo	  wedges	  open	  a	  liminal	  space	  between	  these	  options	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  President’s	  constitutional	  obligations	  to	  ensure	  national	  defense,	  and	  the	  only	  question	  remaining	  is	  “whether	  and	  what	  further	  restrictions	  may	  limit	  its	  exercise.”41	  	   But	  what,	  one	  might	  ask,	  of	  due	  process?	  Where	  might	  the	  courts	  play	  a	  role?	  While	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  targeted	  individual	  and	  the	  nation	  are	  admittedly	  “weighty,”	  the	  memo	  proposes	  a	  balancing	  test	  based	  on	  the	  1976	  case	  of	  Mathews	  v.	  Eldridge,	  which	  David	  Schultz	  identifies	  as	  “an	  administrative	  law	  case	  the	  defines	  when	  the	  government	  must	  provide	  hearings	  to	  individuals	  denied	  Social	  Security	  benefits.”42	  Under	  the	  circumstances	  outlined	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  memo,	  the	  balance	  weighs	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  government,	  in	  the	  person	  of	  the	  executive	  branch.	  As	  the	  memo	  explains,	  “The	  ‘realities’	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  government’s	  interest	  in	  protecting	  its	  civilians	  from	  an	  imminent	  attack	  are	  such	  that	  the	  Constitution	  would	  not	  require	  the	  government	  to	  provide	  further	  process.”43	  The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  also	  provides	  no	  refuge,	  because	  according	  to	  the	  circumstances	  defined	  by	  the	  memo,	  no	  “appropriate”	  judicial	  forum	  is	  available	  for	  resolution,	  and	  any	  judicial	  intervention	  would	  be	  an	  improper	  incursion	  on	  executive	  authority	  that	  Congress	  has	  authorized	  (despite	  any	  specific	  involvement	  of	  Congress	  in	  the	  development	  or	  implementation	  of	  this	  policy).44	  	   The	  point	  about	  Lincoln	  here	  is	  not	  the	  shocking	  nature	  of	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  admission	  that	  it	  was	  targeting	  American	  citizens	  (though	  that	  admission	  certainly	  provoked	  controversy	  and	  condemnation).45	  Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  note	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  argument	  to	  justify	  not	  just	  executive	  action,	  but	  executive	  lawmaking	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  preserving	  the	  nation.	  Behind	  the	  definitions	  and	  court	  cases	  cited,	  the	  memo	  places	  exclusive	  responsibility	  in	  the	  executive	  branch	  for	  determining	  who	  fits	  the	  three	  outlined	  criteria,	  when	  a	  proposed	  action	  under	  the	  policy	  is	  legitimate,	  and	  even	  what	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  “al-­‐Qa’ida	  or	  an	  associated	  force.”	  The	  power	  to	  make	  these	  determinations	  and	  to	  implement	  the	  policy	  fall	  to	  the	  executive	  branch	  entirely,	  but	  the	  exercise	  of	  these	  powers	  is	  explicitly	  described	  as	  legal.	  As	  Spielberg’s	  Lincoln	  argues,	  the	  Obama	  administration	  needs	  these	  powers	  in	  order	  for	  Obama	  to	  uphold	  his	  oath	  of	  office,	  and	  in	  addition	  to	  implement	  national	  self	  defense.	  Because	  the	  oath	  of	  office	  and	  the	  responsibility	  to	  defend	  the	  nation	  require	  swift	  and	  sure	  action,	  the	  President	  must	  simultaneously	  hold	  law-­‐making,	  law-­‐executing,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  “Lawfulness	  of	  a	  Lethal	  Operation,”	  4.	  41	  “Lawfulness	  of	  a	  Lethal	  Operation,”	  5.	  42	  Schultz,	  “Killing	  Americans.”	  43	  “Lawfulness	  of	  a	  Lethal	  Operation,”	  6.	  44	  “Lawfulness	  of	  a	  Lethal	  Operation,	  10.	  The	  final	  substantive	  section	  of	  the	  memo	  argues	  that	  individuals	  who	  act	  under	  these	  circumstances	  are	  protected	  from	  future	  legal	  liability	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  public	  authority	  doctrine.	  45	  The	  Center	  for	  Constitutional	  Rights	  and	  the	  ACLU	  are	  collaborating	  in	  a	  lawsuit	  challenging	  this	  policy	  and	  the	  larger	  “kill	  list”	  that	  includes	  both	  citizens	  and	  non-­‐citizens.	  http://ccrjustice.org/learn-­‐more/faqs/kill-­‐lists.	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interpretive	  powers.	  And	  here	  again,	  while	  the	  claim	  rests	  upon	  the	  extraordinary	  nature	  of	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  nation,	  the	  executive	  branch,	  resting	  upon	  the	  thin	  branch	  of	  the	  AUMF,	  is	  the	  ultimate	  interpreter	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  threat.	  In	  this	  posture,	  the	  executive	  is	  not	  reaching	  out	  for	  power,	  but	  rather	  is	  constitutionally	  required	  to	  exercise	  it	  as	  a	  specific	  and	  constitutional	  responsibility.	  Lincoln,	  ultimately,	  had	  to	  save	  the	  nation,	  just	  as	  Bush	  and	  Obama	  had	  to	  protect	  it.	  	  	   The	  presentation	  of	  Obama	  as	  a	  political	  master	  and	  heir	  to	  Lincoln’s	  legacy	  extends	  beyond	  his	  continuation	  of	  the	  military	  campaign	  against	  terrorists	  and	  terrorism.	  One	  of	  Obama’s	  favorite	  tropes	  is	  to	  call	  for	  greater	  political	  consensus	  and	  collaboration	  across	  party	  lines	  by	  endorsing	  Lincoln’s	  philosophy	  of	  government.	  The	  most	  recent	  example	  took	  place	  in	  Obama’s	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address.	  After	  outlining	  a	  series	  of	  items	  on	  his	  domestic	  agenda,	  Obama	  called	  for	  a	  cooling	  of	  political	  passions,	  stating,	  “We	  need	  to	  end	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  two	  parties	  must	  be	  locked	  in	  a	  perpetual	  campaign	  of	  mutual	  destruction,	  that	  politics	  is	  about	  clinging	  to	  rigid	  ideologies	  instead	  of	  building	  consensus	  around	  commonsense	  ideas.	  I’m	  a	  Democrat,	  but	  I	  believe	  what	  Republican	  Abraham	  Lincoln	  believed:	  That	  Government	  should	  do	  for	  people	  only	  what	  they	  cannot	  do	  better	  by	  themselves	  and	  no	  more.”46	  While	  Obama	  cites	  Lincoln	  as	  a	  Republican,	  he	  places	  a	  set	  piece	  of	  modern	  Republican	  ideology	  in	  Lincoln’s	  mouth	  and	  then	  endorses	  it	  himself.	  	   And	  just	  as	  Bush’s	  conservative	  supporters	  drew	  the	  parallels,	  Obama’s	  foot	  soldiers	  play	  the	  same	  role.	  In	  a	  speech	  widely	  commented	  upon	  in	  right-­‐wing	  media,	  Obama’s	  former	  chief	  of	  staff,	  Chicago	  mayor	  Rahm	  Emanuel	  praised	  Obama’s	  perspicacity:	  “in	  the	  Oval	  Office,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  all	  you	  have	  are	  your	  values,	  your	  judgment,	  and	  your	  ability	  to	  see	  a	  clear	  road	  where	  everybody	  just	  sees	  fog.”47	  He	  then	  urged	  his	  audience	  to	  go	  and	  see	  the	  movie	  Lincoln	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  masterful	  politician	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  conflict	  and	  the	  need	  to	  balance	  competing	  equities.	  Emanuel’s	  remarks	  referred	  not	  to	  Obama’s	  foreign	  policy	  successes,	  but	  rather	  to	  his	  bailout	  of	  the	  auto	  industry	  in	  his	  first	  term.	  Unsurprisingly,	  then,	  many	  pundits	  framed	  the	  key	  question	  about	  Obama’s	  second	  term	  as	  he	  faced	  deep	  partisan	  division	  as	  whether	  he	  could	  hew	  to	  Lincoln’s	  masterful	  path.48 	   Just	  as	  the	  existential	  threat	  of	  the	  war	  justified	  and	  shored	  up	  the	  conception	  of	  Lincoln	  as	  a	  political	  master,	  Obama’s	  image	  benefits	  when	  he	  can	  inhabit	  the	  master	  role	  both	  domestically	  and	  with	  regard	  to	  foreign	  relations.	  As	  Obama’s	  second	  term	  progresses	  (and	  once	  the	  Academy	  Awards	  are	  distributed),	  we	  can	  look	  forward	  to	  increased	  debate	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  Obama	  is	  like	  Lincoln,	  with	  his	  supporters	  arguing	  for	  the	  parallel	  and	  his	  opponents	  discounting	  it	  by	  making	  him	  look	  small	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  mighty	  sixteenth	  President.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Barack	  Obama:	  "Address	  Before	  a	  Joint	  Session	  of	  Congress	  on	  the	  State	  of	  the	  Union,"	  January	  24,	  2012.	  Online	  by	  Gerhard	  Peters	  and	  John	  T.	  Woolley,	  The	  American	  Presidency	  
Project.	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99000.	  47	  Patrick	  Burke,	  “Rahm	  Emanuel	  Likens	  Obama	  to	  Lincoln,”	  CNS	  News,	  December	  3,	  2012,	  http://cnsnews.com/news/article/rahm-­‐emanuel-­‐likens-­‐obama-­‐lincoln.	  48	  See,	  e.g.,	  Doyle	  McManus,	  “What	  Would	  Lincoln	  Do?”	  Baltimore	  Sun,	  November	  29,	  2012,	  http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-­‐11-­‐29/news/bal-­‐what-­‐would-­‐lincoln-­‐do-­‐20121128_1_spielberg-­‐s-­‐lincoln-­‐16th-­‐president-­‐jay-­‐carney.	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*	   *	   *	  	  The	  Lincoln	  of	  the	  popular	  imagination	  is	  a	  laudable	  figure.	  Bill	  Clinton,	  David	  Brooks,	  and	  other	  admirers	  of	  the	  movie	  insist	  that	  much	  of	  Lincoln’s	  genius	  is	  that	  portrays	  a	  real	  and	  complex	  political	  figure	  rather	  than	  an	  icon.	  And	  they	  may	  be	  right	  that	  most	  Americans’	  middle-­‐school	  and	  high-­‐school	  memories	  of	  Honest	  Abe	  would	  have	  to	  stretch	  significantly	  to	  incorporate	  a	  Lincoln	  who	  endorsed	  the	  distribution	  of	  political	  patronage	  and	  perhaps	  even	  bribes	  to	  achieve	  a	  desired	  legislative	  outcome.	  Day-­‐Lewis’s	  Lincoln	  presents	  a	  more	  realistic	  picture	  of	  what	  politics	  was	  like	  in	  the	  antebellum	  era,	  and	  the	  movie	  may	  even	  convince	  a	  few	  people	  that	  longing	  for	  a	  lost	  golden	  age	  of	  high	  decorum,	  principled	  argument,	  and	  bipartisan	  cooperation	  to	  support	  shared	  values	  in	  Congress	  is	  foolish.	  	  But	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  movie,	  particularly	  among	  politicians	  and	  political	  pundits,	  arises	  from	  a	  different	  source.	  The	  movie	  taps	  into	  a	  culturally	  resonant	  conception	  of	  Lincoln,	  portraying	  even	  the	  graft	  he	  authorizes	  as	  the	  politically	  farsighted	  and	  right	  choice.	  There’s	  no	  question	  but	  that	  we	  are	  meant	  to	  admire	  Lincoln	  as	  he	  argues	  to	  his	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  to	  other	  members	  of	  his	  cabinet,	  to	  his	  aides,	  and	  to	  rigidly	  principled	  foil	  Thaddeus	  Stevens	  that	  the	  end	  justifies	  the	  means.	  	  And	  what	  is	  that	  end?	  Audience	  members	  are	  encouraged	  to	  sympathize	  as	  well	  as	  Lincoln	  steers	  Congress	  toward	  a	  neutered	  Thirteenth	  Amendment	  that	  does	  no	  more	  than	  make	  it	  impossible	  to	  reimpose	  slavery	  after	  the	  war	  has	  ended.	  In	  a	  dramatic	  scene	  in	  Congress,	  the	  radical	  promise	  of	  the	  Amendment	  is	  specifically	  disavowed	  by	  none	  other	  than	  Thaddeus	  Stevens	  himself,	  who	  says	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  House	  that	  it	  means	  equality	  before	  the	  law	  and	  nothing	  more.49	  By	  framing	  the	  battle	  over	  the	  amendment	  as	  solely	  a	  location	  for	  the	  presentation	  of	  Lincoln’s	  political	  genius	  in	  forging	  compromise	  where	  none	  was	  to	  be	  found,	  the	  movie	  strips	  out	  the	  context	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	  amendment.	  	  There	  is	  no	  room	  to	  discuss	  the	  agency	  of	  blacks	  in	  ending	  slavery:	  the	  auto-­‐emancipees	  who	  demanded	  to	  take	  up	  arms	  against	  the	  slaveocracy,	  the	  powerful	  black	  abolitionist	  community	  led	  by	  another	  great	  political	  genius,	  Frederick	  Douglass,	  and	  the	  tight-­‐knit	  and	  quietly	  influential	  class	  of	  blacks	  in	  Washington	  who	  stood	  so	  close	  to	  the	  corridors	  of	  power.	  Douglass	  is	  nowhere	  to	  be	  found,	  and	  the	  soldiers	  and	  free	  blacks	  are	  merely	  props	  to	  cast	  a	  brighter	  spotlight	  on	  Lincoln	  himself.	  Lincoln’s	  rejection	  of	  Stevens’	  expansive	  (and	  probably	  temporally	  inaccurately	  expressed)	  vision	  for	  Reconstruction	  also	  provides	  a	  compact	  argument	  to	  support	  contemporary	  discursive	  compromises	  over	  race	  issues.	  The	  movie	  presents	  a	  Thirteenth	  Amendment	  with	  which	  even	  the	  most	  conservative	  Americans	  who	  express	  views	  on	  race	  generally	  accepted	  as	  legitimate	  political	  discourse	  can	  agree.	  And	  perhaps	  that	  was	  the	  point.	  But	  again,	  the	  point	  of	  the	  movie	  is	  not,	  nor	  does	  the	  source	  of	  its	  popularity	  lie	  in,	  the	  real	  Thirteenth	  Amendment.	  It	  captures	  and	  reinforces	  the	  zeitgeist	  of	  a	  moment	  when	  America	  perceives	  itself	  as	  embroiled	  in	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  war	  that	  demands	  transcendent	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  Thirteenth	  Amendment	  discussed	  in	  the	  movie	  could	  readily	  have	  been	  cited	  in	  support	  of	  the	  outcome	  in	  Pace	  v.	  Alabama,	  in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  determined	  in	  1883	  that	  laws	  criminalizing	  interracial	  marriage	  were	  constitutional	  because	  they	  imposed	  the	  same	  penalties	  on	  whites	  and	  blacks.	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leadership	  that	  will	  protect	  and	  preserve	  the	  nation	  above	  all	  else.	  The	  debate	  then	  shifts	  to	  what	  form	  of	  law-­‐overcoming	  works	  best.	  Consider,	  finally,	  John	  Yoo’s	  take.	  The	  notorious	  author	  of	  memoranda	  justifying	  torture	  weighed	  in	  on	  the	  controversy	  over	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  targeted	  killing	  policy,	  criticizing	  the	  administration	  for	  its	  attempt	  at	  legalization:	  	  Those	  of	  us	  in	  the	  Bush	  administration	  who	  worked	  on	  the	  response	  to	  9/11	  understood	  that	  the	  country	  was	  involved	  in	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  war,	  one	  that	  demanded	  the	  covert	  use	  of	  force	  abroad,	  detention	  of	  terrorists	  at	  Guantanamo	  Bay	  without	  criminal	  trials,	  tough	  interrogations,	  and	  broad	  electronic	  surveillance.	  But	  Mr.	  Obama	  and	  many	  of	  those	  who	  would	  become	  his	  advisers	  never	  fully	  accepted—or	  credited—the	  Bush	  administration's	  difficult	  decision	  to	  consider	  9/11	  an	  act	  of	  war.50	  	  Bush,	  in	  Yoo’s	  view,	  seized	  the	  nettle	  firmly	  and	  framed	  the	  conflict	  against	  al	  Qaeda	  as	  a	  war	  that	  demanded	  new	  rules	  of	  engagement	  and	  an	  abandonment	  both	  of	  prior	  practice	  and	  international	  law	  and	  custom.	  Yoo	  praised	  Bush	  for	  rightfully	  drawing	  from	  the	  precedent	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  in	  which	  “every	  Confederate	  soldier	  remained	  a	  U.S.	  citizen,”	  but	  was	  nonetheless	  a	  legitimate	  target	  for	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force.	  Neatly	  inverting	  Rahm	  Emanuel’s	  praise	  for	  Obama,	  Yoo	  accused	  him	  of	  abandoning	  the	  clarity	  of	  war	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “legal	  fog	  threatens	  to	  envelop	  U.S.	  soldiers	  and	  agents	  on	  the	  front	  lines.”51	  Bush’s	  clear	  execution	  of	  his	  own	  executive	  responsibilities	  and	  values,	  for	  Yoo,	  rendered	  even	  waterboarding	  justifiable.	  Ultimately,	  do	  we	  want	  a	  President	  who,	  like	  Caesar,	  “doth	  bestride	  the	  narrow	  world/Like	  a	  Colossus,	  and	  we	  petty	  men/Walk	  under	  his	  huge	  legs	  and	  peep	  about”?52	  I	  ask	  this	  question	  being	  well	  aware	  that	  Americans	  who	  criticize	  the	  hagiographic	  view	  of	  Lincoln	  are	  approximately	  as	  popular	  as	  Cassius.	  But	  by	  celebrating	  an	  image	  of	  Lincoln	  who	  uses	  the	  tools	  of	  political	  mastery	  in	  moments	  of	  crisis	  –	  disunion,	  slavery,	  al	  Qaeda,	  or	  some	  other	  threat	  the	  President	  alone	  believes	  is	  of	  sufficient	  gravity	  –	  to	  justify	  whatever	  the	  President	  believes	  is	  necessary,	  we	  embrace	  a	  dangerous	  dream.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  John	  Yoo,	  “The	  Real	  Problem	  with	  Obama’s	  Drone	  Memo,”	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  February	  7,	  2013,	  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323951904578288380180346300.html.	  51	  Yoo,	  “The	  Real	  Problem	  with	  Obama’s	  Drone	  Memo.”	  52	  Shakespeare,	  Julius	  Caesar,	  Act	  I,	  Scene	  II.	  
